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ABSTRACT 
Today, Internet offers many critical applications. So, it 
becomes very crucial for Internet service providers to ensure 
traceability of operations and to secure data exchange. Since 
all these communications are based on the use of the  Domain 
Name System (DNS) protocol, it becomes necessary to think 
to enhance and secure it by proposing a secure version of this 
protocol that can correct the whole or a part of the DNS 
protocol weaknesses and vulnerabilities. In this context, 
DNSsec was created by the IETF to ensure the integrity of 
DNS data and authentication of the source of such data. 
DNSsec is based on the key cryptography public to provide 
different security services. In the present paper, we will 
present first the DNS protocol and its weaknesses. After that, 
we will be interested in studying the DNSsec implementation 
and data exchange, and then give a deep analysis of its 
weaknesses. 
Keywords: DNS; DNSSEC; Integrity; Authentication; 
Cryptography, Weaknesses Analysis. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The DNS (Domain Name System) is an indispensable part 
for the access to the Internet. The purpose of the DNS is the 
translation of domain names to IP addresses and vice versa; 
this service is called name resolution. However, this service has 
become very vulnerable to several types of attacks. So, it 
becomes necessary to look for a new method or new protocol 
that can remedy to this security problem. In this paper, we will 
see an overview of the name resolution via DNS and the 
vulnerabilities of this service. Then we will present the 
solutions proposed by the DNSSEC protocol, based especially 
on asymmetric cryptography, to secure DNS. In addition, we 
have performed the implementation and tested the DNSsec 
protocol. So we will present an example of our implementation 
in order to secure an original domain name. At the end, we will 
conclude with an analysis of the benefits and weaknesses of 
DNSSEC, and give some perspectives to improve the DNS 
security. 
II. PRESENTATION OF DNS 
The DNS is a server that maps a domain name to an IP 
address. Initially, the Internet was formed by few machines. So 
name resolution was made easily from a file hosts which 
included all the areas names with their IP addresses. But now, 
given the large number of machines connected to the Internet, 
the resolution has become much more complex: for each area, 
there is a name server called "primary name server "and a 
“secondary name server” that replace the primary name server 
in case of malfunction or unavailability. The architecture of the 
DNS database is an inverted tree. The root is at the top 
represented by ".". Each node of the tree has a label that 
identifies it from its parent as shown in “Fig. 1”. 
 
Figure 1.  DNS Domain Name Hierarchy 
Using the tree structure, it is possible to define areas of 
responsibility in the naming. Each one arrow connecting a node 
to a node can convey less information indicating who is 
responsible for the lower level [1]. In other words, the area 
behind the arrow, the father, contains information specifying 
which servers are with information about the son. 
DNS has zone files that define it to be authoritative for 
some domains and slave for others and be configured to 
provide different operations for other domains or users. Zone 
files are numerous, the most important, in Linux system, are: 
a) / etc / named.conf: It contains the server 
configuration, and particularly the list of areas of which the 
server is authoritative (primary or secondary). 
b) /var/named/named.ca: It contains the IP addresses of 
the Top level DNS servers that can inform a user from the root 
of  the hierarchy. 
When a client asks for the IP address of 
‘www.example.com’, the authoritative name server has to 
respond to queries. There are two types of queries defined for 
DNS systems: 
• Iterative mode: In an iterative query, if the name server 
has the answer or if it is available in its cache, it will 
return it. If the name server doesn’t have the answer, it 
will return any information to the next delegation level, 
that may be useful, but it will not make additional 
requests to other name server systems. All name 
servers must support iterative queries. “Fig.2” below 
illustrates an iterative query. 
        
Figure 2.  Iterative query [7] 
• Recursive mode: Answering a query recursively may 
cause the name server to send multiple query 
transactions to a number of authoritative name servers 
in the DNS hierarchy in order to fully resolve the 
requested name. In the recursive query, the receiving 
name server will do all the necessary work to return the 
complete answer for the request. “Fig.3” illustrates the 
recursive query. We note that is not necessary for name 
servers to support recursive queries. 
 
Figure 3.  Recursive query [7] 
III. WEAKNESSES IN DNS 
As described above, the DNS allows machines to 
communicate over the Internet without knowing their IP 
addresses, but the original conception of this service does not 
include any service designed to secure transactions and the 
exchanged data. And therefore, the DNS remains highly 
vulnerable to attacks such as the creation or modification of 
messages, cache pollution, identity theft, etc [2]. “Fig. 4” 
below shows where attacks are possible and each possible 
vulnerability is marked with a question mark. 
 
Figure 4.  Weaknesses of DNS. 
When there is a DNS resolution by a cache server, the attacks 
may be multiple. For example, if an attacker is on the same 
network as the legitimate client, he can return wrong answers 
by responding faster than the legitimate cache server. 
A cache DNS server can return false answers or not to 
return answers at all. Recently, some providers have 
deliberately sent their users to advertising pages when the 
request domain doesn’t exist [5]. 
In 2008, a new form of cache poisoning attack has 
occurred: the attack Kaminsky [5] is intended to poison a DNS 
cache server for an entire domain, not only a single registration 
as in the classic poisoning. It exploits two implementation 
problems of the DNS protocol: the number of expected 
requests, and the fact that the requests UDP source ports are 
always the same. For all these types of threads, a number of 
observers are suggesting that DNSSEC will become the default 
state for all zones. 
We can see in “Fig. 4” that there are weaknesses located in 
DNS message exchanges, as well as potential intrusions in the 
zone file or the cache. There are four security services that may 
be provided by cryptography [7]: 
a) Authentification: The data could only have come 
from a known source. 
b) Confidentiality: Only the concerned parties of the 
communication can understand the messages sent between 
them. 
c) Integrity: The data that is received by one party is the 
data that was sent by the other party. 
d) No-repudiation: The sender of a message should not 
be able, subsequently deny having sent the message. 
 
Authentication and data integrity are both absolutely 
necessary for DNS to deliver a safe service. Indeed, one must 
be able to ensure that the data received from a name server has 
not been altered and to verify the correct source of data. In the 
initial design of the DNS, no action has been taken to ensure 
the safety of the service and none of the security services listed 
above is provided. 
 IV. PRESENTATION OF DNSSEC 
As we have seen, the DNS has many faults and therefore it 
is very vulnerable to attack. Security problems of DNS 
concerns transaction security of DNS messages, data security, 
integrity, authentication and denial of services. 
To remedy to this lack of security, the DNSSEC (Domain 
Name System Security Extensions) protocol is proposed. 
DNSSEC provides two essential security services to DNS: 
DNSSEC ensures data integrity and authentication of the 
source data. In order to implement them effectively, DNSSEC 
uses public key cryptography and digital signatures. 
Two types of keys are identified for use in zone signing 
operations. The first type is called a Zone Signing Key (ZSK), 
and the second type is called Key Signing Key (KSK). 
This extension uses new records (RR KEY, SIG, NSEC and 
DS) in addition to the original DNS records; it manages keys 
and signatures which are necessary for the use of a system of 
public key cryptography [3]. 
a) DNSKEY RR recording: The DNSKEY resource 
record stores all public key pairs. These public keys are 
needed to decrypt the encrypted information received as DNS 
replies. 
b) RRSIG record: The RRSIG record results of the 
signing of RRsets made by the private key of the pair. Each 
domain name in a given area has at least one RRSIG record 
type. 
c) NSEC record: is used by the DNSSEC protocol to 
check that if a negative response was received to a query host, 
it means that the target record doesn’t exist; it’s called proof of 
nonexistence and occasionally denial of existence [7].  
d) DS record: It allows a parent zone to validate the 
KEY record of its child zone. 
The resolution process by DNSSEC is as follows (“Fig. 
5”):  
Figure 5.  Resolution process by DNSSEC [8]. 
 
Each record in the zone file is signed with the area private 
key. The signature generated is placed in a record type SIG. 
Each record type is related to the SIG record type which 
contains the signature. 
If a third party changes the records in the zone file, the 
associated signature will not be correct, and the verification of 
this signature will indicates that the records were changed. This 
ensures the integrity of the records. In addition, only the server 
that has used the key can generate the correct signatures. If the 
signature verification is positive, it is possible to ensure that it 
is the owner of the private key that sent the records; the data 
source is as well authenticated. 
The problem that remains also with DNS protocol is how to 
send a secure reply to a query on a domain name or records 
that don’t exist. If a Resolver requests the address of a machine 
which doesn’t exist, he will receive a response message 
containing an error code in the header of the DNS message and 
no signature is verifiable. To avoid this situation DNSSEC 
introduced the NSEC resource record. 
This recording contains a bit vector indicating all types of 
existing name records associated with the NSEC record, and 
the next name is found in zone file according to the established 
order (lexicographic order on the labels: from the rightmost 
label to the leftmost label. An NSEC record also has its 
associated SIG record, so it is possible to infer securely that a 
name does not exist, if: 
• It is between the domain name associated with the 
NSEC record and the name contained in the NSEC 
record, 
• Record type does not exist,  
• The bit associated with this type is 0 in the bit vector of 
the NSEC record received in response. 
At this stage, all records that are necessary to the security of 
DNS exchanges seem to be defined. However, it was still 
possible for an attacker to generate a pair of keys (public / 
private) to sign false records. It will suffice then to intercept 
DNS requests and respond with false information. This 
introduces the problem of secure delegation of domain names. 
So, it’s necessary to secure entry points in the chain of trust 
while maintaining the hierarchical structure of DNS. 
For this, the RFC 4035 [4] proposes the following process: 
the zone administrator sends his daughter KEY record in the 
parent zone administrator, it signs the KEY record and returns 
the signature. The KEY record in the child zone is now signed 
by the key area of its parent zone. Thus, creating the signature 
of the KEY record in the child zone requires two messages. 
This procedure must be reproduced each time and a change is 
made on the registration of the child zone KEY or when the 
expiry date of the signature is exceeded. 
Delegation Signer method uses a DS record stored in the 
parent zone, which contains among other things, the identifier 
of the public key of the child zone and a hash of the name of 
#dnssec-keygen -a RSASHA1 -b 2000 -n ZONE 
domaine.ma 
#dnssec-keygen -a RSASHA1 -b 2000 -n ZONE -f KSK 
domaine.ma 
#dnssec-signzone -t -k KSK zonefile ZSK 
the child zone concatenated with the key value of the child 
zone. The DS record is constructed as illustrated in “Fig. 6” 
below. 
 
Figure 6.  Chain of trust. 
The administrator signs the child zone's Keyset with its 
private key, sends the KEY record containing the 
corresponding public key to the administrator of the parent 
zone. This creates the correspondent DS record that remains in 
the parent zone. Only one message is used to generate the 
record DS and a new message will be sent to change the DS 
record only when the key area of the child zone, which signed 
the KEY record, changes.  
V. IMPLEMENTATION OF DNSSEC 
 
In the present section, we will present the different steps 
that we have followed to be able to implement and test the 
DNSSEC protocol.  
As mentioned before, DNSSEC is the secure 
extension of DNS protocol, so its implementation should be 
made mandatory on a DNS server which already exists. So, 
first of all, we have started by installing the latest version 
of BIND ‘version 9’, then performed a standard 
configuration of the DNS server by creating a new domain 
name in the main file of DNS ‘/ etc / named.conf’ (it is 
important to note that we are implementing DNSsec in Linux 
system) and zone files in the directory ‘/ var /named’. At the 
end of the configuration, we ensured that the server function 
properly by making resolution tests between the client and the 
server. 
After having the satisfactory operation of the DNS, we 
can move on to the implementation of DNSSEC. This 
is complex task, so it needs to be done with care because any 
mistake can cause serious and costly failure in the network. To 
implement the DNSSEC, we have performed the following 
steps: 
a) Create keys with dnssec-keygen: This is the first step 
in the implementation of DNSSEC, which is to create ZSK 
and KSK that will serve us for the areas signature.  
• ZSK (Zone Signing Key): is a key pair (private/public) 
used to sign the registers in the area. 
• KSK (Key Signing Key): used to sign other keys and 
act as a ‘Chain of Trust’. 
“Fig. 7” below shows the commands used to generate the 
two keys ZSK and KSK. 
Figure 7.  Example of ZSK and KSK generation. 
This step requires the entropy to be accomplished and the 
choice of algorithms and keys size is left to administrators. In 
practice, 90% of areas are protected by RSA-SHA1 [5]. 
 
Figure 8.  Extract of the file ‘kdomaine.ma’ content (public) 
 
Figure 9.  Extract of the file ‘kdomaine.ma’ content (private) 
b) Inclusion of the keys in the zone files: The second 
step is to add the previously created key in the zone file in 
order to be taken into account.  
c) Signature of the zone with dnssec-signzone: It is 
a very important step in configuring DNSSEC because during 
this steps, the areas are signed. To perform this step we need 
to type the command dnssec-signzone, as shown in “Fig. 10”. 
This command creates a new configuration file that has the 
same name as for the DNS, but with the extension '. signed' 
and containing all records in the area supplemented by the 
new DNSSEC recordings. 
 
Figure 10.  Signature of the zone 
file "domaine.ma.signed"; 
dnssec-enableyes; 
 
Figure 11.  Result of the zone signature   
d) Reconfiguration of ‘named.conf’: After the third 
step which create a new signed zone file, we must change the 
name of the old zone file in / etc / named.conf and replace it 
with the name of the new zone file with the extension '.signed', 
and in options, add ‘dnssec-enableyes’, as illustrated in “Fig. 
10”. 
 
Figure 12.  Reconfiguration of ‘named.conf’ 
e) Restart BIND: Restarting the service is an important 
step which needs to be done at the end of the configuration of  
the server to take account of the changes already made. 
 
After having completed all the steps above, we have 
performed the necessary tests to ensure that the configuration 
was correctly done. This step was done initially at the server 
level and then at the client. 
The command 'Dig' gives important information to 
ensure the good or the poor functioning of DNSSEC, so unlike 
the case with DNS protocol, the DNSSEC test with 'Dig' must 
provide the following results: 
• Resource records used by the zone file. 
• The flags 'qr aa rd ra' indicate that the signatures are 
validated and status 'NOERROR' also indicates that the 
configuration of DNSSEC is done without errors. 
These results are illustrated in “Fig. 10” below.  
 
Figure 13.  Test of DNSSEC with ‘Dig’ 
In the other hand, once the DNSSEC server has functioned 
properly, we have performed the test of a DNSSEC client. But 
before the test, the client must contain the server key used by 
the DNSSEC server. To do this, we have executed the 
command: 
'tail -n 1 KSK.key> / etc / trusted-key.key'  
in the client to retrieve the key from the server. And then, we 
have performed the test again with the command 'Dig' and the 
test was conclusive.  
In the DNSSEC test, there may be limits even if the 
configuration is done correctly; this problem can happen in the 
following cases:  
• The used equipments don’t support the file size of the 
area (at least ), in which case it will give a message that 
the maximum size is exceeded.  
• For the clients using the operating system Microsoft 
Windows, the DNSSEC protocol is not supported apart 
from Microsoft Windows 7 which supports it. 
 
VI. WEAKNESSESS AND PROSPECTS OF DNSSEC 
As we have discussed and presented above, the DNSSEC 
protocol have solved many security problems of the DNS 
protocol by providing authentication and data integrity but it is 
still vulnerable to some types of attacks. By adding resource 
records to secure transactions, the size of a DNSSEC zone file 
become seven times larger than that of a DNS file. 
Furthermore, the DNSSEC protocol will use TCP protocol and 
not UDP. This will cause an increase of the network load [2]. 
Moreover, up to now, there is no robust system that can 
face a Denial of Service attack. Therefore, given the size 
DNSSEC messages there is still vulnerable. 
DNSSEC does not protect unsigned records, so we have to 
think about protecting the zone transfer by other techniques. 
In addition, DNSSEC needs to be synchronized between 
the client and the entity making the synchronization, so during 
this phase, there could be an interception of files and the same 
problem can be arised during the keys renewal.  
The deployment of DNSSEC on the internet is currently 
underway. The root zone is signed since July 2010. In March 
2011, 65 top-level domains have a record DS in the root but 
they don’t accept DS records for the stubs zone. Most registers 
don’t add record DS but the most important ones should do it 
in 2011[5].    
VII. CONCLUSION 
The DNSsec is a DNS security protocol that was adopted to 
enhance DNS security and ensure the authenticity and data 
integrity during data exchanges between DNS servers and 
between DNS clients and DNS servers. As we have presented 
in this paper, it uses asymmetric cryptography to provide 
maximum safety for the DNS servers. In addition, it uses new 
resource records and signatures to secure the zone transfer. We 
have been, also, interested in its implementation in a linux 
server, and the results of keys generation, zone signature and 
DNSsec operation have been given. At the end, and since 
DNSsec is still subject of many researches, we have carried out 
an analysis of the weaknesses and lacks of this security 
protocol and we found that, even if it ensures important 
security issues, it is still vulnerable to certain types of attacks.  
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